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Introduction 
 
Against a background of alleged increases to will challenges in England and Wales,1 the possible 
impact of incoherence and uncertainty in the law (as well as their inherent undesirability) and the 
Law Commission’s recent Consultation Paper on wills,2 this article critically considers the doctrine 
that a testator must know and approve of the contents of a valid will. The essence of the doctrine is 
that the will3 must “truly represent the testator’s testamentary intentions”,4 according with the 
“natural and popular idea of the nature of a will”.5 That said, there is doubt as to the extent to which 
it is necessary that the testator understands the true impact of the will’s provisions,6 a problem that 
the Law Commission hopes to solve.7 
Amid claims that the law of “want of knowledge and approval” is not always what litigants 
should plead when they do,8 the article critically explores three ostensibly fundamental principles 
related to it, particularly in light of the difficult and contradictory Court of Appeal decision in Gill v 
                                                      
* Fellow in Law, Robinson College, Cambridge. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 8th Annual 
Meeting of the Association for Law, Property and Society. I am grateful (subject to the usual disclaimer) for comments 
from participants and Siôn Hudson. 
1 See, e.g., L. Warwick-Ching, “Wills face legal challenges as house prices surge” Financial Times, 7 April 2017 at 
https://www.ft.com/content/2f03763e-1a0c-11e7-bcac-6d03d067f81f [Accessed 29 October 2017]. Cf. J. Bryant, “Trusts 
and estates cases: can statistics help to identify trends?—spotlight on probate and estates cases” (2016) 22 Trusts and 
Trustees 962. 
2 Law Commission, Making A Will (Law Commission Consultation Paper 231, 2017) (“C.P. 231”). 
3 Cf. Re Singellos [2010] EWHC 2353 (Ch) at [164] (Deputy Judge Andrew Simmonds QC). 
4 Fuller v Strum [2001] EWCA Civ 1879, at [59] (Chadwick LJ), approved in Marley v Rawlings [2014] UKSC 2; 
[2015] A.C. 129. 
5 Hastilow v Stobie (1865) 1 P. & D. 64, at 67 (Sir J.P. Wilde). 
6 Compare, e.g., Brown v Deacy [2002] W.T.L.R. 781 at [15] (Kim Lewison QC) with Hoff v Atherton [2004] EWCA 
Civ 1554. See, e.g., P. Reed, “Capacity and Want of Knowledge and Approval” in B. Häcker and C. Mitchell (eds.), 
Current Issues in Succession Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016), p.182. 
7 C.P. 231, Consultation Question 40. See, e.g., Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 (Lloyd LJ). 
8 R. Kerridge, “Wills Made in Suspicious Circumstances: The Problem of the Vulnerable Testator” [2000] C.L.J. 310. 
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Woodall.9 One of the key difficulties with the law on want of knowledge and approval is that, as it 
was understatedly put, the identification of the burden of proof is “a little complicated, as it often is 
in probate cases, where presumptions can play a part”.10 The main principles addressed by this 
article (Principles 1, 2 and 3 respectively, albeit not so described in the case law) are therefore: (1) 
that the propounder of a will must “prove” it; (2) that a testator with capacity who duly executes a 
will is nevertheless presumed to know and approve of its contents, shifting the evidential burden 
from the will’s propounder to its challenger; and (3) that (notwithstanding Principle 2) “suspicious 
circumstances” will require affirmative proof of knowledge and approval. In Gill, Lord Neuberger 
arguably both invoked and doubted Principle 2, as well as questioning the traditional approach to 
Principle 3. The article investigates the origin,11 normative justifications and current status of the 
principles, and particularly whether they are compatible with each other. It argues that in several 
respects the law is undesirably inconsistent and unclear, making it potentially too easy to challenge 
a will and at the very least risking excess litigation, and makes several proposals for reform. It also 
considers the Law Commission’s reform proposals, which largely hope to “repair” knowledge and 
approval indirectly by changing the related doctrine of testamentary undue influence, arguing that 
they may not provide a comprehensive solution. 
 
Principle 1: The Propounder of a Will Must “Prove” That Will 
 
The basic principle that the propounder12 must establish knowledge and approval appears to be one 
of the least controversial contentions in the relevant case law. This may suggest that the real 
controversy comes from the other principles and Principle 1’s interaction with them. The burden in 
relation to knowledge and approval13 is part of a broader principle that the propounder must prove 
the will, which also relates to compliance with the formality requirements in the Wills Act 1837.14 
It will be seen, however, that these matters are all the subject of presumptions broadly analogous to 
                                                      
9 [2010] EWCA Civ 1430. 
10 Re Morgan [2008] W.T.L.R. 73 at [35] (Mark Herbert QC). See further R. Kerridge, “Draftsmen and Suspicious 
Wills” in M. Dixon (ed.), Modern Studies in Property Law – Volume 5 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), p.161. 
11 See, generally, Kerridge, “Draftsmen and Suspicious Wills”. 
12 I.e. “the party who puts forward a document as the will of a testator”: Cleare v Cleare (1869) 1 P. & D. 655, at 657 
(Lord Penzance). 
13 A plea apparently first allowed only in Hastilow v Stobie (1865) 1 P. & D. 64 (Kerridge, “Draftsmen and Suspicious 
Wills”, p.162). 
14 Wills Act 1837, s. 9, concerning writing, signature and minimally two witnesses. 
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Principle 2, and in Cleare v Cleare Lord Penzance held that the burden can be discharged “through 
the medium of a presumption unrebutted, or of positive evidence to that end”.15 
In the 1838 case of Barry v Butlin, Parke B was clear that “the onus probandi lies in every 
case upon the party propounding a Will; and he must satisfy the conscience of the Court that the 
instrument so propounded is the last Will of a free and capable Testator”.16 He simply stated that 
the rule was “undisputed”,17 and that “[t]he strict meaning of the term onus probandi is…that if no 
evidence is given by the party on whom the burthen is cast, the issue must be found against him”.18 
The consequence of this, which he spelt out in Baker v Batt, is that “if the conscience of the Judge, 
upon a careful and accurate consideration of all the evidence on both sides, is not judicially 
satisfied, that the paper in question does contain the last Will and Testament of the deceased, it is 
bound to pronounce its opinion that the instrument is not entitled to probate”.19 Strictly, if sufficient 
proof is not forthcoming, the will fails, and this can happen “without the imputation of wilful 
perjury on either side”.20 The burden is a legal21 (“or persuasive”)22 one requiring proof on the 
balance of probabilities.23  
While it is arguable that Principle 1 merely reflects the law’s general approach to a civil 
claim, in some cases the person(s) challenging the will can be described as the claimant(s) because 
the litigation concerns the revocation of probate already granted.24 It might also be thought that 
requiring a burden to be satisfied in the case of every will is inconsistent with an understandable 
desire to avoid unnecessary litigation.25 Nevertheless, in Inchbald v Inchbald, Deputy Judge John 
Martin QC suggested that in practice the burden is cast upon the propounder only “[o]nce an 
                                                      
15 (1869) 1 P. & D. 655, at 657. 
16 (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 480, at 482, described as “binding on courts of first instance and…at least highly persuasive for 
the Court of Appeal” (Perrins v Holland [2010] EWCA Civ 840 at [28] (Sir Andrew Morritt C)). 
17 (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 480, at 483. 
18 (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 480, at 484. See further Hart v Dabbs [2001] W.T.L.R. 527 at [72].  
19 (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 317, at 320. 
20 Ibid. For discussion of remedies in instances of mistake, see, e.g., B. Sloan, Borkowski’s Law of Succession 3rd edn. 
(Oxford: OUP, 2017), pp. 94ff. 
21 See, e.g., Cushway v Harris [2012] EWHC 2273 (Ch) at [3] (Henderson J). 
22 J. Ross Martyn et al, Theobald on Wills, 18th edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) at [3-020]. 
23 See, e.g., Re Butcher [2015] EWHC 1240 (Ch) at [9] (Deputy Judge Lesley Anderson QC). 
24 See, e.g., Re Reynolds [2005] EWHC 6 (Ch). 
25 Particularly since “[a]s far as non-contentious probate is concerned, the formalities for execution of a valid English 
Will do not include any kind of independent verification of knowledge and approval” (B. Rich, “What does ‘want of 
knowledge and approval’ mean in the 21st century?” [2008] P.C.B. 303, p.303). See, e.g., Kerridge, “Wills Made in 
Suspicious Circumstances”, pp.332-3. 
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allegation of want of knowledge and approval is made”.26 Moreover, the Civil Procedure Rules 
requires a party contending that a testator did not know or approve of a will’s contents to give 
particulars of the facts and matters relied on.27 
It has already been mentioned that presumptions have traditionally played a pivotal role in 
this area, and it seems unlikely that the basic notion in Principle 1 can realistically be removed from 
English succession law. While the Law Commission has provisionally proposed a statutory 
presumption of capacity, it may wish to give further thought to how that would interact with 
Principle 1.28 The focus of this article is therefore inevitably on other principles in the law of want 
of knowledge and approval, and the extent to which they support, and render practical Principle 1. 
 
Principle 2: A Testator with Capacity who Duly Executes a Will is Presumed to Know and 
Approve of its Contents 
 
Formulations and Rationale of the Principle 
 
In Barry v Butlin, Parke B was content to say that the burden imposed by Principle 1 “is in general 
discharged by proof of capacity, and the fact of execution, from which the knowledge of and assent 
to the contents of the instrument are assumed”.29 This Principle 2 is potentially significant even if it 
is “only an evidential presumption which may be displaced where the circumstances in which the 
will was made give rise to a sufficient suspicion that the contrary may be true”,30 such suspicions 
traditionally relating to Principle 3 (considered in the next section). 
 The rationale of Principle 2 is clear enough: it prevents the practical difficulties, of 
laboriously proving the will in every case, that would otherwise arise if Principle 1 were to exist in 
undiluted form. In Gill v Woodall, Lord Neuberger was anxious that “a court should be very 
cautious about accepting a contention that a will...is open to challenge”,31 even if “its terms are 
surprising, inconsistent with what [a testatrix] said during her lifetime, unfair, or even vindictive or 
                                                      
26 [2016] EWHC 3215 (Ch) at [7]. 
27 Civil Procedure Rules 1998/3132, r. 57.7(3). 
28 C.P. 231, Consultation Question 6. 
29 (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 480, at 484. See also Cleare v Cleare (1869) 1 P. & D. 655, at 657-8 (Lord Penzance). 
30 Minns v Foster 2002 WL 31914915 at [119] (Deputy Judge Michael Briggs QC).  
31 Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 at [16]. 
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perverse”.32 Since “[w]ills frequently give rise to feelings of disappointment or worse on the part 
of…would-be beneficiaries”,33 he was concerned that: 
 
“Human nature [means that] such people will often be able to find evidence, or to persuade 
themselves that evidence exists…that the will did not…represent the intention of the 
testatrix...If judges were too ready to accept such contentions, it would risk undermining…a 
fundamental principle of English law, namely that people should in general be free to leave 
their property as they choose, and it would run the danger of encouraging people to contest 
wills, which could result in many estates being diminished by…legal costs.”34  
 
He was also conscious that “if the court sets aside a will, the result will be either that an earlier will 
prevails or that the rules of intestacy apply: either eventuality may result in an outcome that appears 
to comply with the wishes of the testatrix even less than that produced by the will at issue”.35 
Whatever impact the ageing process might have on the will-writing population, it is difficult 
to disagree with Lord Neuberger’s general analysis on the policy justifications for Principle 2 in 
most cases.36 It is therefore ironic that, as will be seen later in this section, Lord Neuberger 
jeopardised the continued application of that principle in Gill itself. 
 The precise prerequisites for the principle arising, and its strength, have been the cause of 
uncertainty over the years, even before Lord Neuberger apparently cast doubt on the existence of 
the principle in Gill. Not all formulations mention the requirement that the testator read the will 
before executing it before the presumption is raised,37 but this ingredient is at the centre of other 
cases.38 
It was thankfully made clear by the House of Lords in the 1875 case of Fulton v Andrew that 
Principle 2 is not a conclusive presumption even if it includes a reading requirement that has been 
satisfied.39 This is contrary to some earlier authorities holding that Principle 2 is conclusive (at least 
                                                      
32 Ibid, at [26]. 
33 Ibid, at [16]. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, at [26]. 
36 Cf. R. Kerridge, Parry and Kerridge: The Law of Succession, 13th edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) at [5-49]. 
See also Reed, “Capacity and Want of Knowledge and Approval”, p.183. 
37 See, e.g., Hoff v Atherton [2004] EWCA Civ 1554 at [62] (Chadwick LJ). 
38 See. e.g., Gregson v Taylor [1917] P. 256, at 261 (Hill J). 
39 (1875) 7 H.L. 448. 
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in the absence of actual fraud).40 Judge Lewison QC has nevertheless interpreted Fulton as meaning 
that “it is only in an exceptional case that where a person of testamentary capacity reads his will, a 
court will refuse to infer knowledge and approval”.41 He was prepared, however, to accept that, at 
least in cases of borderline capacity, “the more complex the will, the greater will be the need for the 
explanations” of the will’s contents to the testator.42  
Conversely, the courts have sometimes been willing to infer reading from due execution in 
order to raise the presumption.43 It seems that “[t]he appropriateness of the way in which a will is 
read to a testator and the reaction he had to it, however that may have been manifested, will depend 
on all the circumstances”, and it will not necessarily be problematic if he reacts passively.44 
Lord Neuberger’s own formulation in Gill was that “[a]s a matter of common sense and 
authority, the fact that a will has been properly executed, after being prepared by a solicitor and 
read over to the testatrix, raises a very strong presumption that it represents the testatrix’s intentions 
at the relevant time, namely the moment she executes the will”.45 This could be read as imposing an 
additional requirement for legal advice to Principle 2, although it might limit the function of 
Principle 3 since “suspicious circumstances” may be removed by legal advice. It may be that there 
are several possible presumptions making up Principle 2, whose strengths vary according to the 
factors raising them. If true, this is not necessarily problematic, but it is something that would 
benefit from clarification. 
In Gregson v Taylor,46 Hill J made some surprising remarks about the strength of Principle 2 
as a presumption. He went as far as to say that “if it is said that [the documents] represent [a 
testator’s] will and something more”, i.e. something additional has been added to the will that he 
did not intend, then “before that something more can be rejected as not being his will it must be 
established beyond all doubt that it is not his will”.47 If this is generally true, this would be higher 
than the burden imposed to prove knowledge and approval where Principle 3 is engaged (and seems 
                                                      
40 See, e.g., Guardhouse v Blackburn (1866) 1 P. & D. 109, impliedly criticised in Re Morris [1971] P. 62, at 76 (Latey 
J); Ross Martyn et al, Theobald on Wills, at [3-024]. 
41 Brown v Deacy [2002] W.T.L.R. 781 at [11]. 
42 [2002] W.T.L.R. 781 at [16]. 
43 See, e.g., Sherrington v Sherrington [2005] EWCA Civ 326 at [98] (Peter Gibson LJ). 
44 Re Endoya [2009] EWHC 2181 (Ch) at [99] (Deputy Judge William Trower QC). 
45 [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 at [14]. 
46 [1917] P. 256. 
47 Ibid, at 261. 
 7 
higher even than a standard of beyond reasonable doubt). This is another respect in which a 
member of the judiciary has caused confusion. 
 If Principle 2 is to continue, the law in this area would significantly benefit from a 
clarification of the precise requirements for the presumption to be raised and its implications. While 
reading might be reasonable (even if inferred), requiring legal advice would go too far in potentially 
robbing the presumption of a considerable amount of its practical benefit, although the absence of 
legal advice could be recognised as a good reason for rebutting the presumption (in combination 
with other factors). An onerous Principle 2 could also leave many cases where the solution is not 
governed by any presumption or its rebuttal, including because Principle 3 (depending on its nature 
and scope) does not apply either, which would again be practically undesirable.  
 
Knowledge and Approval’s Relationship with Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence 
 
This sub-section considers the relationship of want of knowledge and approval with testamentary 
capacity, one of Principle 2’s clearer prerequisites, and testamentary undue influence. Such 
relationships are particularly important in light of the Law Commission’s consultation paper.  
In addition to Principle 2 itself (subject to its continuing validity), the propounder can also 
benefit from a presumption of due execution (where the requirements of the Wills Act appear to 
have been carried out),48 and of capacity in the case of a will that is rational on its face,49 and in that 
respect Principle 2 is consistent with other areas of succession law.  
 Despite the relevance of capacity to Principle 2, the courts have not always scrupled to 
distinguish inter alia testamentary capacity, want of knowledge and approval and undue 
influence.50 On Kerridge’s analysis, pleadings themselves are often confused, perhaps deliberately 
due to the costs rules involved.51  
There has nevertheless been some judicial disagreement as to whether or not testamentary 
capacity is a prerequisite for knowledge and approval. In Sharp v Adam, for example, the judge 
found that the alleged testator knew and approved of the disputed will, even though the testator’s 
inability to speak, read or write meant that knowledge and approval could not be proved by 
                                                      
48 See, e.g., Sloan, Borkowski’s Law of Succession, pp.130ff. 
49 See, e.g., ibid, p.79. It has been seen that C.P. 231 has proposed a statutory presumption of capacity. 
50 See, e.g., Reed, “Capacity and Want of Knowledge and Approval”, pp.186-88. 
51 Kerridge, Parry and Kerridge, at [5-58]; see further Reed, “Capacity and Want of Knowledge and Approval”, p.186 
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execution,52 and the judge also found that testamentary capacity was lacking.53 In Walters v Smee, 
by contrast, Judge Purle QC recognised that “[g]iven [his] conclusions on lack of capacity, the 
question of want of knowledge and approval does not arise”, and “[i]t is somewhat artificial to deal 
with it on the assumption that the deceased had capacity when [he had] held that she did not”.54  
 Some uncertainty arguably remained even when the Court of Appeal considered the matter 
in 2010. In Perrins v Holland, Sir Andrew Morritt C held that Barry makes clear that “the fact to be 
proved is knowledge and approval in the sense of acceptance of the contents”, which “does not 
require full testamentary capacity”.55 Despite these comments, Sir Andrew was prepared to accept 
that “[p]lainly testamentary capacity is a prerequisite to knowledge and approval because if the 
former is not shown there is no need to look for the latter”.56 But he was not prepared to accept that 
knowledge and approval has to be proved where Parker v Felgate57 (relating to changes in capacity 
or knowledge between instruction and signing) applies (the focus of the decision in Perrins), 
provided that “(a) the testator believes that it gives effect to his instructions and (b) it does in fact do 
so”.58 As Moore-Bick LJ expressed it, “knowledge and approval requires no more than the ability to 
understand and approve choices that have already been made”.59 An appropriate conclusion 
following Perrins is that capacity is a pre-requisite for knowledge and approval, but that it is 
suitably adjusted to accommodate Parker v Felgate. 
 In a very welcome proposal, the Law Commission has provisionally proposed a clarification 
that testamentary capacity relates to the ability relevantly to know the contents of the will rather 
than whether the testator did so,60 which should help to clarify the relationship between the two. 
The very word “capacity” suggests an ability, while “knowledge and approval” relates more to a 
state of affairs. 
 Unlike execution, capacity and knowledge and approval, the absence of undue influence 
does not form part of the propounder’s burden of proof. It is for the will’s challenger to prove undue 
                                                      
52 See, generally, R.F.D. Barlow et al, Williams on Wills, 10th edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at [3-022]; Non-
Contentious Probate Rules 1987/2024., r. 13.  
53 [2005] EWHC 1806 (Ch). 
54 [2008] EWHC 2029 (Ch) at [129]. 
55 [2010] EWCA Civ 840; [2011] Ch. 270 at [28]; see also [63] (Moore-Bick LJ). 
56 Ibid, at [31]; see also [65] (Moore-Bick LJ). 
57 (1883) 8 P.D. 171. See, generally, Sloan, Borkowski’s Law of Succession, pp.78ff; 88ff.  
58 [2010] EWCA Civ 840 at [32], approving [2009] EWHC 1945 (Ch) at [52] (Lewison J). 
59 [2010] EWCA Civ 840 at [64].  
60 C.P. 231 at [2.81]. Its preference, however, is simply to extend the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to testamentary 
capacity (Consultation Question 3). 
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influence, and there is currently no relational presumption as there is with inter vivos transfers.61 In 
Gill v Woodall, Lord Neuberger thought it “rather unreal to consider arguments as to the nature and 
extent of the influence [the testatrix’s husband] exerted on his wife to persuade her to leave the farm 
to the [Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals], when [he had] just concluded that 
she did not know that she was doing that very thing”.62 This suggests that in order to be unduly 
influenced per se, the testator must have both testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval of 
the will.63 
Kerridge has argued that a case where a beneficiary prepares a will whose contents the 
testator does not know and approve, there must have been either undue influence or fraud, and he 
has gone so far as to suggest that fraud or coercion should be presumed in such a case.64 But 
becoming involved in the preparation of the will of a potentially vulnerable person does not 
necessarily amount to fraud or coercion (the standard presently used in testamentary undue 
influence cases), and fraud is a particularly grave finding. The courts have favoured retaining the 
boundaries between knowledge and approval and other concepts even if they have not always 
policed those boundaries effectively, and it will be seen that want of knowledge and approval can 
extend beyond cases where the beneficiary was involved in preparation. Increased clarity on this 
matter would nevertheless be beneficial. It is noteworthy that “once fraud is established, all 
presumptions of due execution (and knowledge and approval) would cease to have any sway and 
the [propounder] would not be able to establish that the [will] was executed at a time when the 
Testatrix had testamentary capacity and knew and approved its contents”.65 This is related to 
Principle 3, although it will be seen that there is doubt about whether Principle 3 can legitimately be 
used where true fraud is alleged. Since the Civil Procedure Rules came into force in 1999 the 
previous procedural restrictions66 on pleading facts relevant to any other ground of invalidity of a 
will without specifically pleading that ground itself no longer apply to probate claims, although any 
alleged ground of invalidity must be properly pleaded and particularised.67 
                                                      
61 See, e.g., B. Sloan, “Reversing Testamentary Dispositions in Favour of Informal Carers” in Häcker and Mitchell 
(eds.), Current Issues in Succession Law. Cf.  C.P. 231, ch. 7. 
62 [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 at [66]. 
63 See also, e.g., Poole v Everall [2016] EWHC 2126 (Ch); [2016] W.T.L.R. 1621 at [137] (HHJ David Cooke). 
64 R. Kerridge, “Undue influence and testamentary dispositions: a response” [2012] Conv 129. 
65 Re Gale [2010] EWHC 1575 (Ch) at [130]. 
66 See, e.g., Kerridge, “Wills Made in Suspicious Circumstances”. 
67 See Rich, “What does ‘want of knowledge and approval’ mean in the 21st century?”, p.305 for discussion. 
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While the Law Commission provisionally rejected the simple extension of the general 
equitable doctrine to the testamentary context,68 it proposed that a testamentary undue influence 
doctrine should be enshrined in statute, which would take either a “structured” or a “discretionary” 
form.69 A “structured” approach would involve a similar rebuttable presumption to the inter vivos 
version raised via a relationship of influence (itself presumed or proved) and a disposition calling 
for explanation. In the testamentary context, it would be decided whether a disposition calls for 
explanation based on either “the conduct of the beneficiary in relation to the making of the will” or 
‘the circumstances in which the will was made”.70 The Commission did not recommend any 
changes to the costs rules,71 hoping that, if its reforms to undue influence (and the extent of 
knowledge required for want of knowledge and approval) took effect, more cases would be litigated 
as undue influence claims and the question of presumptions would become less relevant to a 
narrower knowledge and approval doctrine. This may be true to some extent, but it will become 
clear that its suggestion is not a comprehensive solution. 
The article must now address a matter that is perhaps even more crucial than the relationship 
of Principle 2 with other concepts (under the current law as distinct from a reformed law), namely 
whether Principle 2 has survived the difficult Court of Appeal decision in Gill v Woodall at all. 
 
The Trouble with Gill and its Aftermath 
 
The analysis of Lord Neuberger’s remarks in Gill undertaken thus far suggests that he was a strong 
supporter of Principle 2 because of its important practical implications. Perhaps oddly then, and 
ironically raising a knowledge and approval issue of its own, when applying the unreported 1956 
case of Re Crerar to cast doubt on Principle 3,72 Lord Neuberger appeared to approve Sachs J’s 
further assertion there that “[t]he fact that the testatrix read the document, and…that she executed it, 
must be given the full weight apposite in the circumstances, but in law those facts are not 
                                                      
68 C.P. 231, Consultation Question 36; see, e.g., B. Sloan, “Due rewards or undue influence? – Property transfers 
benefitting informal carers” [2011] Restitution Law Review 37. 
69  C.P. 231, Consultation Questions 37-38. 
70 Ibid at [7.119]. The alternative “discretionary” approach might be a recipe for litigation, making the “structured” 
approach preferable. 
71 Ibid at [7.136]. 
72 It was, however, the subject of an article published at 106 Law Journal 694 and the statements of law have been 
verified: see Re Morris [1971] P. 62, at 78. 
 11 
conclusive, nor do they raise a presumption”.73 This may not be consistent with Lord Neuberger’s 
other remarks in Gill about the importance of Principle 2, and significantly adds to the uncertainty 
of the law. The Law Commission has said that Lord Neuberger made his “very strong presumption” 
remarks “whist rejecting the idea that a formal evidentiary presumption of knowledge and approval 
will be raised”,74 but that is surely unsatisfactory since either there is a presumption or there is not. 
It is theoretically possible that Sachs J was saying that Principle 2 does not create an 
irrebuttable or legal presumption, but that would add little to saying that “in law those facts are not 
conclusive”. Moreover, Durston treats evidential presumptions as a subspecies of legal 
presumptions, distinguishing them from “irrebuttable presumptions of law”.75 It seems more likely 
that Sachs J was distinguishing conclusive rules of law, such as that rightly rejected in Fulton, from 
rebuttable evidential presumptions such as Principle 2, and asserting that neither a rule of law nor a 
rebuttable presumption existed in relation to knowledge and approval of a validly executed will by a 
testator with capacity (who had read it). 
Further quotations from Re Crerar appear in Re Morris.76 On the basis that “inquiries 
touching the validity of a testamentary disposition have always been considered matters touching 
the conscience of the court”, Sachs J rejected “the idea that there is any rule of law applicable to 
unusual cases which can so put that conscience into a strait-jacket as to preclude it from drawing 
inferences in the usual way and thus force the court to a decision which would, on the particular 
facts, be artificial”.77 It is arguable that Sachs J’s reference to “unusual cases” casts doubt on his 
own assertion that reading and duly executing the document raises no presumption, but his general 
approach seems inconsistent with Principle 2 and Lord Neuberger did not quote that aspect of the 
judgment. Is there therefore a distinction between a presumption that the will represents the 
testator’s intentions at the relevant time (explicitly recognised by Lord Neuberger) and a 
presumption of want of knowledge and approval? This cannot possibly be a distinction that Lord 
Neuberger himself wished to draw, since his very formulation of the legal doctrine of want of 
knowledge and approval in the judgment is precisely that “the will ‘represented one’s testamentary 
intentions’”.78 
                                                      
73 Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 at [22].  
74 C.P. 231 at [7.15]. 
75 G. Durston, Evidence: Text & Materials, 2nd edn. (Oxford: OUP, 2011), ch. 4. 
76 [1971] P. 62, at 78, a mistaken drafting case (see, e.g., Ross Martyn et al, Theobald on Wills, at [3-025]ff). 
77 Quoted in Re Morris [1971] P. 62, at 78 and verified by Sachs LJ.  
78 Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 at [14], quoting Fuller v Strum [2001] EWCA Civ 1879 at [59] (Chadwick 
LJ). 
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The potential difficulties with Principle 2 that in my view are present post-Gill do not appear 
to have been particularly widely picked up by the judiciary,79 albeit that Sachs J’s relevant words 
have been re-quoted.80 There are some cases where the court has potentially downplayed the 
significance of the presumption post-Gill. In Webster v Ashcroft, HHJ Purle QC invoked Principle 1 
but admitted that satisfying that burden may be “assisted by established presumptions in an 
appropriate case”.81 He nevertheless proceeded to decide that the testatrix knew and approved of the 
disputed will’s contents “irrespective of any presumption”.82 
In the post-Gill case of Wharton v Bancroft, however, Norris J did assert that “the Court can 
infer knowledge and approval from proof of capacity and proof of due execution” and that this plus 
reading over “raises a very strong presumption that it represents the testator's intentions at the 
relevant time”.83 In Re Burns, the Court of Appeal’s formulation was that “[i]t is right that in many 
a case proof of capacity and due execution will suffice to establish knowledge and approval”.84 
It may be argued that there are differences between an assertion that due execution by a 
testator with capacity will usually discharge a burden of proof and an assertion that there is a 
presumption (even a rebuttable one) to that effect. It is highly significant, however, that when 
giving judgment in the Supreme Court in Marley v Rawlings (a case ultimately decided on 
rectification) Lord Neuberger said that: 
 
“There is a rebuttable presumption that the testator knew and approved the contents of a 
regularly executed will with unexceptional provisions. However, that presumption may be 
rebutted by evidence of the circumstances in which the will was prepared or executed [or] 
where the will is so worded as to cast doubt on whether the testator can have known or 
approved of its contents.”85 
 
This is a softer view on whether Principle 2 exists, and what its prerequisites are, than the same 
judge expressed in Gill.86 Moreover, in Elliott v Simmonds, Gill was explicitly cited as authority for 
                                                      
79 See also, e.g., Ross-Martyn et al, Theobald on Wills, at [3-017]. 
80 See, e.g., Hawes v Burgess [2012] W.T.LR. 423 at [123] (HHJ Walden-Smith), upheld [2013] EWCA Civ 94. 
81 [2013] EWHC 1316 (Ch) at [41]. 
82 [2013] EWHC 1316 (Ch) at [42].  
83 [2011] EWHC 3250 (Ch) at [28].  
84 Re Burns [2016] EWCA Civ 37 at [52] (McCombe LJ). 
85 [2014] UKSC 2 at [43]. 
86 See also Elliott v Simmonds [2016] EWHC 732 (Ch) at [70] (Deputy Judge Edward Murray). 
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the proposition that “the prima facie case is strengthened where the will has been prepared by and 
independent and experienced solicitor and read over to the testator”,87 which seems to suggest that 
Lord Neuberger was acknowledging the existence of a weaker presumption strengthened by the 
addition of legal advice, rather than suggesting that it was a core feature of Principle 2.88  
One case that very significantly did pick up the difficulty that I have highlighted is Inchbald 
v Inchbald, where Deputy Judge John Martin QC asserted: 
 
“…the statement at the end of that quotation [from Sachs J] to the effect that execution after 
reading over does not raise a presumption is in conflict with an earlier passage in Lord 
Neuberger's own judgment which [he had] quoted above.”89  
 
He opined that “[t]hey may perhaps be reconciled by treating Sachs J as speaking of a legal 
presumption, and Lord Neuberger of an evidential presumption”,90 an argument considered above. 
He held that: “[w]hether that is so [or] not, however,…the correct approach is to treat execution 
after reading over as being merely one of a number of factors which may lead to the conclusion that 
the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will, although it will often be of great 
importance to that conclusion”.91 He professed both to “have adopted the holistic approach to the 
evidence enjoined on me by Gill v Woodall”, and to “have…borne in mind the policy argument 
referred to by Lord Neuberger” about the importance of being slow to declare wills invalid.92  
 While it is gratifying that the difficulty with Gill as regards Principle 2 has been identified 
by at least one member of the judiciary and is not merely a product of the author’s imagination, the 
balance of authorities suggests that some version of Principle 2 still exists. This is not necessarily a 
problem, and indeed Deputy Judge Martin’s approach is itself not free from difficulty. The law, 
nevertheless, is crying out for clarification on whether Principle 2 remains valid and, if so, what its 
scope is, particularly given the importance for practice that it does remain true. 
 It has been seen that the Law Commission’s hope is that its proposed reforms to the undue 
influence doctrine will reduce the reliance on presumptions. It proposes that knowledge and 
approval should be specifically confined to a requirement that the testator: 
                                                      
87 [2016] EWHC 732 (Ch) at [70] (Deputy Judge Edward Murray). 
88 See also Poole v Everall [2016] EWHC 2126 (Ch) at [116] (HHJ David Cooke). 
89 [2016] EWHC 3215 (Ch) at [8]. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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“(1) knows that he or she is making an will; 
(2) knows the terms of the will; and 
(3) intends those terms to be incorporated and given effect in the will.”93 
 
While this would be a welcome clarification, specifying precisely what a testator needs to 
know/intend is not the same as specifying in which circumstances (if any) he will be presumed to 
know/intend it. Moreover, although it may be true as a matter of practice that most suspicious wills 
cases will be litigated as undue influence if the proposed reforms take effect, if knowledge and 
approval is to remain a separate requirement it would be helpful for practitioners to know if and in 
what circumstances it will be presumed so that they can advise clients effectively. Even if a 
presumption of undue influence clouds the distinction between it and knowledge and approval, it is 
noteworthy that it has been said that when the inter vivos undue influence doctrine is truly at issue 
“the influencee...will always know what he or she is doing; the question is why”.94  
  
Principle 3: “Suspicious Circumstances” Require Affirmative Proof of Knowledge and 
Approval 
 
In Perrins v Holland, Sir Andrew Morritt C held that “it is clear from its origins that the 
requirement of knowledge and approval is a shorthand reference to the need for evidence to rebut 
suspicious circumstances”.95 This statement is in itself potentially confusing, since suspicious 
circumstances might themselves rebut or otherwise affect Principle 2. It does, however, illustrate the 
historical importance attached to such circumstances.  
In Barry v Butlin, alongside Principle 1, the other “well established” principle invoked by 
Parke B was that “if a party writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a benefit, that is a 
circumstance that ought generally to excite the suspicion of the Court, and calls upon it to be 
vigilant and jealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument, in favour of which it 
ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper 
propounded does express the true Will of the deceased”.96 He declared the Privy Council to be 
                                                      
93 C.P. 231 at [7.149]. 
94 Leeder v Stevens [2005] EWCA Civ 50, at [19] (Jacob LJ). 
95 [2010] EWCA Civ 840 at [25]. 
96 (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 480, at 482-483. 
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“fully sensible of the wisdom of this rule, and the importance of its practical application on all 
occasions”.97  
 
The Scope of Suspicious Circumstances 
 
As might be expected, the precise scope of relevant “suspicious circumstances” has been the subject 
of considerable uncertainty over the decades, and Kerridge has criticised the concept for failing to 
make clear to what the suspicion relates.98 It might be sufficient simply to say that some facts raise 
a suspicion that the testator did not know and approve of the will’s contents after all. 
In Barry, with reference to Paske v Ollat99 inter alia, the rule was said to be that “there are 
cases of Wills prepared by a Legatee, so pregnant with suspicion, that they ought to be pronounced 
against in the absence of evidence in support of them…”.100 It was nevertheless not true that “in 
every case in which the party preparing a Will derives a benefit under it, the onus probandi is 
shifted, and that not only a certain measure but a particular species of proof is thereupon required 
from the party propounding the Will”.101 Parke B gave the example of a solicitor who receives £50 
from an estate worth £100,00 having drafted a will for a “man of acknowledged competence and 
habits of business”.102 He considered it “obvious” that the burden would not be thrown back on the 
propounder in such circumstances, and continued: 
 
“All that can be truly said is that if a person, whether attorney or not, prepares a Will with a 
Legacy to himself, it is, at most, a suspicious circumstance, of more or less weight, 
according to the facts of each particular case…”103 
 
On the facts of Barry, suspicions were raised by the fact that the preparer had taken a quarter of the 
estate,104 albeit that the suspicions were removed because essentially the will was intended to be 
executed openly and fairly in the presence of “respectable” witnesses. 
                                                      
97 Ibid, at 483; see further Re R [1951] P. 10, at 15, Leyne v McGhee 1982 WL 967713. 
98 Kerridge, “Undue influence and testamentary dispositions: a response”, p.139. 
99 (1815) 2 Phillimore 323.  
100 (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 480, at 484. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid, at 485. 
103 Ibid. 
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The relationship between the preparer of the will and the testator may affect the application 
of the suspicious circumstances doctrine. That said, the mere fact that it is very common for spouses 
to leave property to each other, or for parents to benefit their children, will not prevent the 
application of the doctrine to preparers falling within those categories. In Franks v Sinclair, the 
testatrix’s son (a solicitor) conceded that the doctrine applied to him in circumstances where he had 
drawn up a will substantially benefiting him and excluding a nephew with whom he was not on 
speaking terms and to whom the testatrix was very close (in contrast to the previous will).105 In Re 
Endoya, a beneficiary arranged for the taking of instructions and execution of the will, later 
suppressing that fact, but this was held not to be “remotely suspicious” because “she genuinely 
believed that she was taking steps to give effect to the deceased’s wishes, in circumstances in which 
other members of the family had not taken the steps…, being steps which she genuinely and 
reasonably believed he wished to have pursued”.106 It was held that “while a course of conduct in 
one set of circumstances may raise suspicions, a similar course of conduct in other circumstances 
may be entirely innocent and above suspicion”.107 A highly fact-sensitive and potentially 
unpredictable approach is therefore in evidence. 
Unsurprisingly, there has been some doubt on the extent to which suspicious circumstances 
will be present in cases beyond the beneficiary procuring or drafting the will (even if conversely not 
all cases where such a benefit is taken will necessarily excite suspicion). In Tyrell v Painton, it was 
confirmed that the suspicious circumstances doctrine was not confined to cases where the 
beneficiary had prepared the will, and on its facts extended the rule to circumstances where the will 
was prepared by the beneficiary’s son.108 In Minns v Foster, Deputy Judge Michael Briggs QC 
opined that “there is no limit to the type of evidence which might persuade a court that it required 
something more than capacity plus due execution as evidence of knowledge and approval”.109 The 
beneficiary’s care of the deceased and suggestibility arising from bereavement were considered 
                                                                                                                                                                                
104 Ibid, at 487-8. Kerridge, “Wills Made in Suspicious Circumstances”, p. 323 has argued that Barry is truly a case of 
undue influence or fraud and did not involve a plea of want of knowledge and approval, but it has been widely treated 
as an authority on want of knowledge and approval. 
105 [2006] EWHC 3365 (Ch). 
106 [2009] EWHC 2181 (Ch) at [96] (Deputy Judge William Trower QC). See also, e.g., Blackman v Man [2007] 
EWHC 3162 (Ch). 
107 [2009] EWHC 2181 (Ch) at [100] (Deputy Judge William Trower QC). 
108 [1894] P. 151. 
109 2002 WL 31914915 at [118]. 
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relevant (albeit obiter) in Re Key,110 and the suspicions were not dispelled. Such factors may have 
more relevance to undue influence (consistently with the Law Commission’s approach), however, 
and it remains true that cases where a beneficiary was involved in the will’s preparation are “classic 
examples” of suspicious circumstances.111 Moreover, in Ark v Kaur, and possibly in direct contrast 
to Minns, HHJ Cooke expressly rejected counsel’s submission that “there is no limit to the range of 
circumstances which may excite suspicion”.112 In Re R, it was emphasised that the suspicious 
circumstances must have some relevance to the preparation and execution of the will itself. Mere 
attachment to or affection for the beneficiary will go the other way in the sense of explaining the 
disposition. Relevance to preparation and execution was one limiting proposition from Williams, 
Mortimer and Sunnucks113 approved by HHJ Cooke in Ark. The other, despite Kerridge’s arguments, 
was that the suspicious circumstances rule cannot be used “as a screen for allegations of fraud and 
dishonesty, which must be pleaded and proved”.114 
Gill v Woodall itself illustrates that suspicious circumstances can be present where the major 
figure aside from the testatrix neither draws up the will nor necessarily stands to benefit from it, and 
even where the beneficiary connected to that figure is not a human one. That said, Kerridge has 
suggested that Gill should have been analysed as a case of lack of capacity (not pleaded).115 Mr and 
Mrs Gill had left their farm to the survivor in the first instance and then to the RSPCA, excluding 
their only daughter according to Mr Gill’s wishes, despite Mrs Gill describing that Society as “a 
waste of time” and “a bunch of townies”.116  
While at first instance in Gill Judge James Allen QC identified a wide range of suspicious 
circumstances, the Court of Appeal (in addition to their doubts about the validity of Principle 3 per 
se in the first place) held that many of them would on their own “fall well short of justifying the 
conclusion that Mrs Gill did not know or approve of the contents of the will”.117 These included the 
attitude of Mrs Gill to the RSPCA during her lifetime; the non-provision for her daughter in spite of 
care provided in addition to labour on the farm (for which gratitude had been expressed). The Court 
of Appeal nevertheless held that: 
                                                      
110 Re Key [2010] EWHC 408 (Ch) at [119] (Briggs J). 
111 Hart v Dabbs [2001] W.T.L.R. 527 at [24] (Lloyd J). 
112 [2010] EWHC 2314 (Ch) at [43] (HHJ Cooke). 
113 See now J. Ross Martyn et al, Williams, Mortimer & Sunnucks - Executors, Administrators and Probate, 20th edn. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at para. [13-23]ff. 
114 [2010] EWHC 2314 (Ch) at [43]. 
115 Kerridge, Parry and Kerridge, at [5-47]. 
116 [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 at [29] (Lord Neuberger). 
117 Ibid, at [26] (Lord Neuberger). 
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“…there is no doubt that the[se] sort of factors…may properly be added into the balance to 
support other factors, where they exist, which call into question whether the testatrix knew 
and approved of what was in her will.”118  
 
The other, primary, factors were her agoraphobia, meaning that she feared leaving the farm and 
interactions with strangers, and that when she did so (particularly during meetings with her 
solicitor) the resulting anxiety was severe enough to limit her ability to concentrate and absorb 
information; that it was therefore “unlikely she would have been able to take in the entire words 
spoken and the effect thereof, in particular the provision for the [RSPCA] and the consequences 
thereof” at that meeting if the will had simply been read out (which the Court of Appeal ultimately 
considered probable); and that her words and conduct after signing the will were consistent with her 
anticipating that her family would inherit the farm.119 
The fact that a will was prepared shortly before death may not itself excite suspicion even if 
a will had not previously been made, albeit that “there may be circumstances in which the known 
imminence of death may be a pointer towards the possibility that the deceased was in a state of 
mind in which he did not fully know and approve of what he was doing”.120 In Ark, however, HHJ 
Cooke took a (perhaps overly) restrictive approach meaning that inter alia the testator’s previous 
refusal to make a will was insufficiently connected to the process of drawing up and executing the 
disputed will to be relevant to Principle 3. It has been seen that Lord Neuberger in Gill accepted 
that, at least normally, “the mere fact that the terms of a will are surprising or worse should not, 
without more, raise a presumption that the testator did not know or approve of the will”.121 
If the “suspicious circumstances” doctrine survives Gill, it is undesirable for the court to 
take an overly formalistic approach to the circumstances that might excite suspicion, even if a 
considerable degree of evidence of whatever the circumstances are might be necessary in order to 
avoid undermining any Principle 2. It be seen in due course, however, that Principle 3 is itself 
doubtful following Gill. 
 
The Effect of Suspicious Circumstances 
 
                                                      
118 Ibid, at [27] (Lord Neuberger). 
119 Ibid, at [24] (Lord Neuberger), citing [2009] EWHC 3778 at [476]. 
120 [2009] EWHC 2181 (Ch) at [102] (Deputy Judge William Trower QC). 
121 Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 at [46] (Lord Neuberger). 
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In Re Morgan, Judge Mark Herbert QC opined that, once suspicious circumstances of some weight 
have been raised, “the relevant evidence then has to be evaluated in order to determine the issue as a 
question of fact”.122 He then added, perhaps confusingly, that “[a]t that stage…there is no 
presumption one way or the other”.123  
It is not always made clear whether suspicious circumstances potentially rebut Principle 2 
(leading to a further opportunity for the propounder nevertheless to prove want of approval 
affirmatively, so that the presumption will not necessarily be fully rebutted by the presence of 
suspicious circumstances) or prevent Principle 2 from arising in the first place. In Gregson v Taylor, 
it was suggested that Principle 2 arose in the first place only “in cases where there is no fraud, or 
suspicion of fraud”.124 It has been seen, however, that Marley may take a different approach, 
apparently suggesting that suspicious circumstances will rebut a presumption that has already 
arisen.125 He did, however, define the scope of Principle 2 with reference to “unexceptional 
provisions”.  
Whether Principle 3 relates to the prerequisites for Principle 2 or provides a means of 
rebutting it of course depends on the formulations of Principle 2, and it was clear from the last 
section that not all such formulations include terminology relating to Principle 3. It is arguably 
denied the status of a true presumption if prevented from arising by matters extraneous to its 
definition. The practical importance of a widely applicable and strong Principle 2 has already been 
highlighted and, somewhat conversely, there is arguably little point in it being rebuttable if it arises 
in the first place only in the absence of suspicious circumstances. This is yet another matter 
requiring clarification, the best method perhaps being to say that Principle 3 potentially rebuts 
Principle 2 (provided both remain in existence). Facts related to Principle 3 would in addition be 
relevant where a Principle 2 presumption could not be raised on its own terms. 
 
Removing the Suspicion 
 
Barry introduces another uncertainty related to the means by which a “suspicion”, once raised, may 
be removed: while Parke B held it unnecessary in all cases where the drafter takes a benefit under 
the will for “the precise species of evidence of the deceased's knowledge of the Will…to be in the 
shape of instructions for, or reading over the instrument, even”, “[t]hey form, no doubt, the most 
                                                      
122 [2008] W.T.L.R. 73 at [35]. 
123 Ibid. 
124 [1917] P. 256, at 261. 
125 [2014] UKSC 2 at [43] (Lord Neuberger). See also, e.g., Re Hinch [2013] EWHC 13 at [74] (Judge Behrens). 
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satisfactory…description of proof, by which the cognizance of the contents of the Will, may be 
brought home to the deceased”.126 As was seen in the last section, such reading might surely be 
pivotal in the establishment of Principle 2 rather than merely being evidence through which 
suspicion may be dispelled,127 albeit that there may be a distinction between merely “reading” and 
“reading over” by a solicitor. Of course, if Principle 2 does not arise where circumstances relevant 
to Principle 3 are present (an argument considered above), it makes sense for Principle 2’s 
requirements to be found in the means through which the Principle 3 suspicions can be removed. If 
some version of both Principle 2 and Principle 3 survives, an important task for reformers of the 
law of want of knowledge and approval is to decide which factors form part of Principle 2 
(presumed validity), which are factors that might dispel Principle 3 suspicions, and (if Principle 2 is 
not to arise where Principle 3 factors are present) which are relevant to both of these. It has been 
seen that a less onerous version of Principle 2 would serve the objective of upholding the general 
validity of wills. 
Sometimes it is said that, where suspicious circumstances are present, it is for the 
propounder to convince the court of the “righteousness of the transaction”.128 In Fuller v Strum, 
however, Peter Gibson LJ described this as “perhaps an unfortunate term” because it suggests that a 
moral judgment on the part of the court is required.129 
In Wintle v Nye, Viscount Simonds asserted that there were circumstances “so grave that 
[the degree of suspicion] can hardly be removed”.130 On the facts of Wintle, in contrast to Barry, 
“the circumstances were such as to impose on the respondent as heavy a burden as can well be 
imagined” and could not be removed.131 The testatrix was an elderly lady “unversed in business”,132 
and the will left most of her estate to the solicitor who drafted it. She had expressed a wish to leave 
her residuary estate to charity only a few months before the disputed will was executed. She 
received no independent advice (the solicitor having made little effort to persuade her to acquire it), 
and he retained the will without giving her a copy. 
Judge Behrens declared the case before him in Wyniczenko v Plucinska-Surowka may well 
have been a modern example of an instance where suspicion could “hardly be removed”, since there 
                                                      
126 (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 480, 485-6. 
127 See also, e.g., Franks v Sinclair [2006] EWHC 3365 (Ch). 
128 See, e.g., Fulton v Andrew (1875) 7 H.L. 448, at 472. 
129 [2001] EWCA Civ 1879 at [33]. Cf. Kerridge, “Draftsmen and Suspicious Wills”, p.160. 
130 [1959] 1 W.L.R. 284. For very detailed discussion, see Kerridge, “Wills Made in Suspicious Circumstances”. 
131 [1959] 1 W.L.R. 284, at 291. 
132 Ibid. 
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inter alia the will was prepared on the computer of the sole beneficiary, it was in English (a 
language that the Polish testatrix did not speak well) and made no provision for her family or her 
church, the beneficiary had not explained it to her, and he had behaved suspiciously after the 
testatrix’s death (albeit that treating this fact as suspicious for these purposes is potentially 
inconsistent with Re R).133 In Re D, moreover, suspicions were raised by the fact that previous wills 
had been professionally advised upon and drafted, whereas the disputed one was not; that it used 
spelling and language in a way that would have been anathema to the testatrix; that it contained 
inaccurate statements about her family that she would not characteristically have included; that it 
contained radical changes lacking explanation, the sole beneficiary being the barely known son of 
the testatrix’s carer; and the medical evidence suggested that the testatrix was incapable of dictating 
the will.134 They were not removed.  
That said, the burden of proof on the propounder remains the balance of probabilities rather 
than beyond reasonable doubt.135 In Re Good,136 counsel for the claimant accepted that she and her 
family were sufficiently involved in the execution of the will for suspicions to be excited,137 even 
though their approach to the drafting solicitor was probably made on the testatrix’s initial 
instructions and he gave independent advice on the point. The burden was nevertheless held to be 
discharged because inter alia of an explanatory meeting with another solicitor earlier in the same 
month.138 
Even where suspicions are aroused and the propounder has the burden of showing 
knowledge and approval affirmatively, Rimer J held in Re Reynolds that “[t]hat does not, however, 
mean that nothing less than positive evidence of such knowledge and approval will do”, since “[i]f 
all the circumstances properly justify an inference that the testator did know and approve the 
contents of the disputed will, that will be sufficient to discharge the burden.”139 No such inference 
could be made on the facts, since the will was drawn up on the defendant beneficiary’s instructions 
                                                      
133 Wyniczenko v Plucinska-Surowka [2005] EWHC 2794 (Ch). See, similarly, Vaughan v Vaughan [2002] EWHC 699 
(Ch). 
134 [2009] EWHC 1951 (Ch), seemingly also known as Dewas v Mackay. See further Kerridge, Parry and Kerridge, at 
para. [5-42]. 
135 Fuller v Strum [2001] EWCA Civ 1879 at [72]. 
136 [2002] EWHC 640 (Ch). 
137 See also, e.g., Clancy v Clancy [2003] EWHC 1885 (Ch) at [62] (Rimer J), Allen v Emery [2005] EWHC 2389 (Ch). 
138 See also Minns v Foster 2002 WL 31914915. 
139 Re Reynolds [2005] EWHC 6 (Ch) at [121]. 
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and there was no safe evidence that it was in the testatrix’s custody so that she must have read it. 
Sometimes, however, not very much evidence is required to rebut the suspicious circumstances.140 
As with the issue whether Principle 3 rebuts Principle 2 or prevents it from arising in the 
first place, it is not always clear whether a decision is founded on the absence of suspicious 
circumstances in the first place or the fact that any suspicions have successfully been removed.141 In 
formulating its final proposals, the Law Commission should take care to ensure that a similar issue 
does not arise as between the raising and dispelling of its suggestion of a presumption of 
testamentary undue influence. In Minns v Foster, Deputy Judge Michael Briggs QC went so far as 
to say that there is an element of “artificiality in considering, having heard all the evidence on 
knowledge and approval, whether the circumstances would have given rise to a sufficient 
suspicion” to necessitate an enquiry.142 The claimant had “risen to the challenge of proving 
knowledge and approval by evidence other than mere capacity and due execution, so that the 
question whether there was a burden on her to do so is of essentially historic interest only.”143 
 This somewhat presages the approach taken several years later in Gill, as will be seen in the 
next sub-section. In Gill itself, the possibilities (which the Court of Appeal rejected in any case) that 
Mrs Gill attended a previous meeting with her solicitor or that she read the draft will in advance of 
the execution meeting, and the fact that the will was read to her at the execution meeting were not 
enough to allay the suspicion on the traditional approach in this “exceptional” case. 
 
Gill’s One-Stage Approach and its Aftermath 
 
In Gill v Woodall, Lord Neuberger described the value of the “two-stage” approach, of establishing 
whether there were suspicious circumstances and then whether the propounders had allayed those 
suspicions, as “questionable”.144 He considered preferable the approach outlined by Sachs J in Re 
Crerar (the same unreported case creating the difficulties with Principle 2 considered in the last 
section), namely that the court should “consider all the relevant evidence available and then, 
drawing such inferences as it can from the totality of that material,…come to a conclusion whether 
or not those propounding the will have discharged the burden of establishing that the testatrix knew 
                                                      
140 See, e.g., Boudh v Bodh [2007] EWCA Civ 1019; Shuck v Loveridge [2005] EWHC 72 (Ch). 
141 See, e.g., In the Estate of Wilkes [2006] W.T.L.R. 1097. 
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and approved the contents of the document”.145 This approach may have merit given the possibility 
of debate over which circumstances are “suspicious” in the first place, whether a factor forms part 
of Principle 2 or is a means by which a suspicion may be removed, and on particular facts whether a 
suspicion has been removed or simply never raised in the first place. His suggestion, however, 
causes its own difficulties. 
Lord Neuberger was anxious that Gill should not be seen as “something of a green light to 
disappointed beneficiaries…to challenge the will even where it has been read over to the testatrix, 
or to appeal a full and careful first instance decision upholding a will’s validity”.146 He emphasised 
the “exceptional” nature of the case, since the testatrix suffered from an extreme version of a rare 
condition, and the judge was being reversed on the facts because the findings through which he held 
Principle 3 to be rebutted were not open to him on the evidence. Reed nevertheless opines that the 
Gill approach means that “attacking wills on the basis of want of knowledge and approval may have 
a greater chance of success”,147 and this will be particularly true if it casts doubt on Principle 2 as 
well. 
Despite all of this, Lord Neuberger found it “none the less convenient to follow the two-
stage process adopted by the judge below in Gill, since “the answer should be the same” as if a 
single question had been posed.148 This in itself contributes to the uncertainty in, and unsatisfactory 
nature of, the law. The answer may well be the same in many cases where a judge considers the 
evidence in a lengthy trial, but surely some of the core advantages of presumptions and precision on 
the circumstances in which they are both raised and rebutted is that they shape legal advice and 
might avoid a trial altogether.149 These advantages are undesirably lost if Principles 2 and 3 are 
weakened. 
Responses to Gill on whether Principle 3 exists and what its scope is have been mixed. Lord 
Neuberger’s suggested one-stage approach has not universally been taken up. In Cushway v Harris, 
for example, Henderson J proceeded to adopt the traditional two-stage approach without reference 
to Gill, although it is true that the defendant beneficiary did not appear before him and the 
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circumstances of the case were extremely questionable.150 The same approach, however, was taken 
in Pearce v Beverley following a full trial.151 
Giving a Court of Appeal judgment in Fitzgerald v Henry, moreover, Rafferty LJ asserted 
both that the appeal “raises no issue of law, precedent or other matter of general significance”152 but 
also that “[s]uspicious circumstances where made out place the onus on the propounder of the will 
to prove knowledge and approval”, whereas “[a]bsent suspicious circumstances, the Court will 
assume the deceased knew and approved the will if it were read to him” (without apparently citing 
direct authority for those propositions).153 Hardly a ringing endorsement of Lord Neuberger’s 
approach in Gill. 
In Wharton v Bancroft, Norris J potentially clouded the issue of a one-stage versus two-
stage approach by saying that he would decide the case “on the totality of the evidence without 
tracing the shifting evidential burden”.154 The very suggestion that the evidential burden shifts, 
however, may hark back to a two-stage approach, while the emphasis on “totality”, seen in other 
cases,155 may be an attempt to apply a one-stage approach. Reed does indeed regard Wharton as a 
case where the one-stage approach was applied,156 although other cases have been clearer. It has 
been seen that in Webster v Ashcroft HHJ Purle decided the case “irrespective of any 
presumption”.157 In Lloyd v Jones, moreover, it was emphasised that knowledge and approval was 
to be “assessed on the basis of the evidence as a whole”.158  
In Re Butcher, in a clear attempt to marry the two approaches, it was held that “Lord 
Neuberger in Gill did not rule out use of the two stage approach for the future”, but that it was 
“clear from the judgment at [22] that he favoured instead a single stage approach”.160 Deputy Judge 
Lesley Anderson QC held that the correct approach was to apply the one-stage test in the first 
instance, following which the “two stage test can usefully be deployed as a cross-check to the 
conclusions reached using the single stage test”.161 In the case at hand, she concluded that the 
                                                      
150 [2012] EWHC 2273 (Ch).  
151 [2013] EWHC 2627 (Ch).  
152 [2016] EWCA Civ 701 at [2]. 
153 Ibid.  
154 [2011] EWHC (Ch) 3250 at [87]. 
155 See, e.g., Schrader v Schrader [2013] EWHC 466 (Ch) at [92] (Mann J). 
156 Reed, “Capacity and Want of Knowledge and Approval”, p.185. 
157 See also, e.g., Cowderoy v Cranfield [2011] EWHC 1616 (Ch) at [146] (Morgan J). 
158 [2016] EWHC 1308 (Ch) at [8]. 
160 [2015] EWHC 1240 (Ch) at [11] (Deputy Judge Lesley Anderson QC). 
161 Ibid, at [14]. 
 25 
propounder had satisfied the burden “by considering all of the evidence in the holistic way 
approved…in Simon v Byford and, in those circumstances, it is not necessary or helpful for [her] to 
decide this case by reference to a strict application of the legal and evidential burdens of proof”.162 
She then held that the challenger would have established suspicious circumstances “but that any 
degree of suspicion was relatively low because it was not a case where the [later, disputed] Will 
was procured by the person benefitting under it”, and “[o]n a full consideration of all the evidence, 
[she] would have found that [the propounder of the later will] had amply rebutted any such prima 
facie case”.163 
 In Simon v Byford, the Court of Appeal had held that “[t]he correct approach for the trial 
judge is clearly set out in Gill v Woodall…[i]t is a holistic exercise based on the evaluation of all 
the evidence both factual and expert”.164 But in the immediately preceding passage Lewison LJ 
might have detracted from that very clarity by saying that “[t]he reason for the [want of knowledge 
and approval] requirement is the need for evidence to rebut suspicious circumstances”.165 
In Re Burns in 2016, the Court of Appeal apparently confirmed it to be unnecessary for the 
judge to follow the two-stage approach.166 It was nevertheless also confirmed in Re Burns that 
affirmative evidence would be required where there were suspicious circumstances, albeit that 
sometimes not very much evidence is required.  
It seems, therefore, that the courts have struggled to dispense with the notion of “suspicious 
circumstances” despite Gill, another source of confusion and uncertainty in the law. It has been seen 
that the Law Commission hopes to move “suspicious circumstances” cases to be covered by a new 
law of undue influence. That may be appropriate, since in many cases the reason why the testator 
has not acquired the requisite knowledge might be a relationship of influence that could justifiably 
be presumed undue, even if it falls short of the current “coercion” threshold. Undue influence may 
be a more apt description of the reason that the will is invalid, such that the lowering of the 
threshold is acceptable, and it is relatively clear that a case such as Wintle or Wyniczenko could be 
accommodated within the Law Commission’s approach.  
There are, however, at least two potential difficulties. First, the Commission’s suggestion is 
partly premised on the assertion that “presumptions appear to have less relevance in the current 
state of the law given the holistic, one-stage approach to knowledge and approval preferred by the 
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Court of Appeal in Gill v Woodall”,167 whereas the above analysis implies that this is an optimistic 
view. Secondly, the Commission has admitted that in other cases, “the key issue, other than the 
testator’s capacity, would continue to be whether the testator knew and approved of the terms of the 
will”.168 Arguably problematically, the Commission gave Gill v Woodall as an example of such a 
case not involving suspicious circumstances,169 whereas Lord Neuberger omitted expressly to say 
that it was not such a case even if he preferred a different methodology. That case also demonstrates 
that the influencing behaviour may not always come from an ultimate beneficiary. The law of want 
of knowledge and approval might therefore need some reform beyond clarifying the requirements 
scope, even if it is a statement that want of knowledge and approval should not be pleaded in some 
circumstances. 
 
Synthesis and Conclusion 
 
This article has taken three core principles on the law of want of knowledge and approval (that a 
will’s propounder must “prove” it; that a testator with capacity who duly executes a will is 
presumed to know and approve of its contents; and that suspicious circumstances require 
affirmative proof of knowledge and approval) and highlighted several areas of uncertainty and 
confusion surrounding them. These include: the extent of “knowledge” required; the relationship of 
want of knowledge and approval with other succession law doctrines; the precise requirements for 
Principle 2 and the strength of the presumption; and the scope and effect of “suspicious 
circumstances” for the purposes of Principle 3 (and how these latter two matters interact with each 
other). 
The main focus, however, has been on the continued existence and validity of Principles 2 
and 3. On Banerjee’s analysis, “Lord Neuberger's one stage approach [in Gill] seems to eject [the] 
presumption [represented by Principle 2 in this article] and shift the burden of proof to the 
propounder, who will have to prove knowledge and approval in addition to testamentary 
capacity”.170 It could certainly be argued that there is a logical consistency to saying that neither 
Principles 2 nor 3 now exist. If (per Sachs J) the facts involved in Principle 2 do not give rise to a 
presumption, there is nothing for the will challenger to rebut using Principle 3 (and the propounder 
does not have to rebut Principle 3 either). The facts involved in Principles 2 and 3 would simply 
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become part of the overall burden that the propounder has (by virtue of Principle 1, and would have 
had in any event if he could not raise Principle 2), unmitigated under this analysis of the current, 
post-Gill law, albeit that in most cases the Principle 2 facts will mean that the court declares for the 
propounder. The serious difficulty with this interpretation, however, is that in other parts of Gill 
Lord Neuberger seemed very clear that Principle 2 does exist and that it is of very considerable 
practical importance. If Principle 2 does indeed exist, what of the possible abolition of Principle 3 
through Lord Neuberger’s one-stage approach? If that abolition means that the challenger need not 
point to “suspicious circumstances” to rebut Principle 2, is it for the court alone to determine 
whether Principle 2 is sufficient to discharge the burden imposed by Principle 1? This renders 
Principle 2 pretty meaningless as a “presumption”. Perhaps it means that the narrow approach to 
“suspicious circumstances” should no longer be applied, although Lord Neuberger was still fairly 
rigorous as to which circumstances were primarily relevant and which were merely supportive in 
the context on the facts of Gill. Or perhaps it means that the challenger does have to point to 
“suspicious circumstances”, but rather than shifting the burden back to the propounder once proved 
the court simply has to evaluate their relevance on their own terms. This approach is reflected in 
some of the pre-Gill cases anyway. 
It seems unlikely that Principle 1 will be removed from the scope of want of knowledge and 
approval. While the absence of undue influence is on the other side of the “line” in respect of the 
propounder’s burden, it is arguable that knowledge and approval is closer to testamentary capacity 
than the absence of undue influence and therefore should in principle form part of that burden. If 
knowledge and approval is to continue as a separate requirement and were to be reformed in its own 
right, the preferable approach might therefore be to confirm Principle 2 as a true presumption 
(albeit a rebuttable evidential one) in view of the serious practical difficulties that might otherwise 
ensue, provided that its precise requirements can also be clarified.  
As regards the facts that might somehow undermine the presumption (traditionally 
represented by Principle 3 but now undermined by Lord Neuberger and thought better dealt with 
through undue influence by the Law Commission), the law would also be improved if it could be 
confirmed whether they truly are potentially rebutting a presumption that has already arisen (with 
the advantages described above) rather than preventing it from arising in the first place. It should 
also be confirmed that a potentially wide range of circumstances might accomplish whatever 
process is occurring, albeit that (for example) the mere fact that a will is surprising will not 
necessarily be enough. It might be beneficial to dispense with the adjective “suspicious”, which 
may undesirably imply wrongdoing that has not necessarily occurred. The simple terminology of 
“potentially rebutting” circumstances (if that is indeed what they do) may be better. As for whether 
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the burden of proof should revert back to the propounder, it might seem unnecessarily complex for 
it to do so, since it may already have shifted once since it was originally with the propounder by 
virtue of Principle 1 because of its potential move to the challenger under Principle 2, and the 
propounder may have no further evidence on which he can rely depending on the content of 
Principle 2. That said, it may be easier to conceptualise what is happening if it does so shift, rather 
than having the court simply evaluate simultaneously whether there are “suspicious”/”potentially 
rebutting” circumstances and whether these have been removed or rendered inoperative.  
While the Law Commission accepted that “reform could proceed by way of clarifying the 
presumptions that apply in the area of knowledge and approval” as outlined in this article,171 it 
preferred to address several of the difficulties in the area by reforming testamentary undue 
influence. This may well be an effective method of dealing with many of the difficulties identified 
with Principle 3. It has been seen, however, that this may not be a comprehensive solution in light 
inter alia of the value of Principle 2. 
Whatever particular course is taken, clarification is important and necessary in the light of 
the potentially increasing scope for will challenges and conversely the traditional emphasis placed 
on testamentary freedom in England and Wales.172 This will be an important task for the Law 
Commission and then Parliament, or perhaps ultimately the judiciary themselves.  
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